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The outcomes of our decisions often evoke in us strong 
emotional reactions. Thus, the successful investor may ex-
perience elation, and the unsuccessful investor may feel 
dejected, regretful, or disappointed. The regret to which a 
negative outcome gives rise is determined, at least in part, 
by a comparison of the factual outcome and some coun-
terfactual alternative or reference point (see, e.g., Baron & 
Ritov, 1994; Boles & Messick, 1995; Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Mellers, 2000; Ritov & Baron, 1995). The referent 
of this comparison may be the most easily imaginable al-
ternative outcome (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), an alter-
native outcome that one has observed (Mellers, Schwartz, 
& Ritov, 1999), an outcome achieved by another person 
(Boles & Messick, 1995), or the status of things before 
the decision was made (Baron & Ritov, 1994). In this ar-
ticle, we will be concerned with how best to understand 
the comparisons that determine how much regret people 
attribute to decision makers who have made different de-
cisions but achieved the same negative outcome.
Our concern with decision makers who make differ-
ent decisions but achieve the same outcome stems from 
the literature on the action effect. One of the best-known 
claims to have been made about the role of comparisons in 
determining the emotional consequences of decision mak-
ing is that when negative outcomes follow action, these 
outcomes are more painful than the same outcomes when 
they result from inaction. The earliest finding in the litera-
ture about the action effect is that people attribute more 
regret to an actor than to a nonactor following a negative 
outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Participants in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment received the follow-
ing scenario:
Mr. Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year 
he considered switching it to stock in company B, but he 
decided against it. He now finds that he would have been 
better off by $1,200 if he had switched to the stock of com-
pany B. Mr. George owned shares in company B. During 
the past year he switched to stock in company A. He now 
finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he 
had kept his stock in company B. Who feels greater regret? 
(p. 142)
A large majority of the participants in this study felt that 
Mr. George, the actor, would feel more regret. This action 
effect has been replicated and generalized to positive out-
comes (in which the questions asked concerned feelings 
of joy) by Landman (1987) and Gleicher et al. (1990).
An early explanation for the action effect was that in-
action is more normal than action (Kahneman & Miller, 
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People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced 
a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For 
some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus ap-
pears to rely on comparisons between people’s representations of action and their representations of 
inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that 
have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain 
counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to 
flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, 
we confirm our predictions about participants’ fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an 
action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to partici-
pants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to 
judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision 
scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base 
their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.
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1986). Accordingly, it is easier to generate a counterfac-
tual in which an actor did not act than it is to generate a 
counterfactual in which a nonactor acted. Kahneman and 
Miller appeal to this asymmetry in the generation of coun-
terfactuals for action and inaction in order to explain the 
action effect. The relative ease with which a counterfactual 
state of affairs can be imagined for the actor is said to lead 
participants to estimate that he would feel greater regret.
The fact that a temporal aspect to the action effect exists 
has been demonstrated by Gilovich and Medvec (1994), 
who gave participants the following scenario:
Dave and Jim do not know each other but both are enrolled 
at the same elite East Coast University. Both are only mod-
erately satisfied where they are and both are considering 
transferring to another prestigious school. Each agonises 
over the decision, going back and forth between thinking he 
is going to stay and thinking he will leave. They ultimately 
make different decisions: Dave opts to stay where he is and 
Jim decides to transfer. Suppose their decisions turn out 
badly for both of them: Dave still doesn’t like it where he is 
and wishes he had transferred, and Jim doesn’t like his new 
environment and wishes he had stayed. (p. 360)
Gilovich and Medvec observed the standard action effect 
when participants were asked who would feel more regret 
in the short term. However, when the question concerned 
long-term regret, participants were more likely to attribute 
greater regret to the nonactor.
In this article, we wish to present a modified version of 
the mental models account of the action effect (see Byrne 
& McEleney, 2000). The mental models theory of think-
ing was originally devised to account for people’s deduc-
tive reasoning (see Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). It has also been used to analyze probabilistic 
(see Johnson-Laird, P. Legrenzi, Girotto, M. S. Legrenzi, 
& Caverni, 1999) and counterfactual (see Byrne, 1997, 
2002; Thompson & Byrne, 2002) thinking. According to 
the mental models theory, people reason by representing 
discrete states of affairs that are consistent with the in-
formation given to them in the problem scenario. These 
representations take the form of mental models.
Recently, Byrne and McEleney (2000) have sketched 
how the mental models theory might account for the ac-
tion effect. According to Byrne and McEleney, the action 
effect occurs because people have a more explicit repre-
sentation of action than they do of inaction. Thus, people 
construct two models to represent the decision made by 
Mr. George, the actor in the investment scenario:
  Current: Company A
  Past: Company B
The first of these models corresponds to the actual state 
of affairs in which Mr. George has traded his stock and 
missed out on a profit, whereas the second refers to the 
counterfactual state of affairs in which he did not trade 
his stock and made a profit. Byrne and McEleney claim 
that, because the current and past states of affairs for the 
nonactor are identical, the initial model set for Mr. Paul, 
the nonactor, is more economical than for Mr. George. 
Thus, people have just one model in their initial represen-
tation of the nonactor. The action effect in the investment 
scenario occurs because the comparison between people’s 
model of what actually happened and their model of what 
might have happened results in a higher rating of regret for 
the actor. Because the model set for inaction does not con-
tain a counterfactual model, no comparison can be made, 
and less regret is attributed to the character who decided 
not to act.
Byrne and McEleney (2000) also point out that the in-
vestment and university scenarios are dissimilar because 
counterfactual outcomes are fixed in the former, whereas 
they are uncertain in the latter. Thinking counterfac-
tually, we know for sure that if Mr. Paul had traded his 
stock he would have been better off by $1,200 and that if 
Mr. George had not traded his stock he would have been 
better off by $1,200. In the university scenario, however, 
we don’t know how Dave would have fared had he moved. 
According to Byrne and McEleney, this uncertainty about 
the counterfactual for inaction leads to the occurrence of 
an inaction effect in the long term. According to them, 
people base short-term judgments of regret for Dave on an 
economical initial representation containing an unfleshed-
out mental model in which Dave is currently at College A 
and unhappy. Because the representation of the actor’s situ-
ation is explicit (i.e., it contains a model corresponding to 
the pre- and postaction states of affairs), an action effect 
occurs in the short term. However, people ascribe long-term 
regret to Dave on the basis of a fully fleshed-out representa-
tion that contains models corresponding to the factual state 
of affairs as well as to the counterfactual states of affairs in 
which he moved and was unhappy and in which he moved 
and was happy. The recognition of this last possibility leads 
to the occurrence of the inaction effect in the long term 
(see Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). Byrne and McEleney 
 confirmed—as predicted by their account—that for the 
investment scenario participants do not switch to inaction 
regrets in the long term.
An experiment described by N’gbala and Branscombe 
(1997), who gave the investment scenario to three groups 
of participants, raises problems for Kahneman and Miller’s 
(1986) and Byrne and McEleney’s (2000) accounts of the 
action effect. The participants in the first group received 
the standard scenario and were asked to estimate the regret 
felt by each character, and the participants in the other 
two groups received information about, and gave regret 
estimates for, either the actor or the nonactor. Although 
an action effect occurred with the standard scenario, no 
difference was found in the amount of negative emotion 
attributed to the characters when participants received 
information about only one character. In addition, par-
ticipants who received information about both characters 
were equally likely to mutate the actor’s and the nonac-
tor’s behaviors in an “if only” sentence-completion task. 
N’gbala and Branscombe suggested that comparisons be-
tween the characters underlie the action effect observed in 
participants who receive the investment scenario.
The primary aim of this article is to examine how a men-
tal models approach may be reconciled with the finding 
that the use of a within-participants design is often neces-
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sary (but not always; see, e.g., J. J. Seta, McElroy, & C. E. 
Seta, 2001; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 
2002) to cause the occurrence of an action effect. To this 
end, we wish to suggest that people’s initial mental model 
representations for action and inaction may be somewhat 
different from those suggested by Byrne and McEleney 
(2000). We suggest that people might always construct at 
least two, and sometimes three, mental models. Under our 
proposal, one of these models corresponds to the factual 
state of affairs and another to an upward counterfactual 
state of affairs with a positive outcome (see, e.g., K. D. 
Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).
The suggested model sets for the characters in the in-
vestment and university scenarios are shown in Table 1. 
As we have already noted, the nature and number of the 
counterfactuals for each of the characters in the investment 
scenario are fixed by the nature of the decision described 
therein. Because only one factual model and one upward 
counterfactual model are possible, when considering two 
models people construct a fully fleshed-out representation 
for each of the decisions described in the investment sce-
nario. Strong support for this claim comes from N’gbala 
and Branscombe’s (1997) finding that, when considering 
the investment scenario, people are as likely to mutate in-
action as they are action. 
The university scenario differs from the investment 
scenario in that it imposes fewer constraints on counter-
factual possibilities. That is, both Dave, the nonactor, and 
Jim, the actor, in the university scenario might have made 
the opposite decision and been happy or unhappy. In our 
proposal, the initial representation for Dave contains one 
factual model and just one counterfactual model. Dave 
is described as wishing he had moved. Given the nega-
tive outcome arising from his decision not to act, we ex-
pected participants to generate the upward counterfactual 
in which he moved and was happy (see K. D. Markman 
et al., 1993). The suggested model set for Jim, on the other 
hand, contains two counterfactual models, one in which 
he did not transfer and was happy (the upward model, see 
K. D. Markman et al., 1993) and one in which he did not 
transfer and was unhappy. Because Jim was unhappy at 
College A before deciding to transfer, it is possible that he 
would have continued to be unhappy had he decided not 
to transfer. Because this state of affairs was described in 
the scenario, the corresponding downward counterfactual 
model is likely to be available to participants along with 
the upward counterfactual model.
When people learn of each character individually (as 
they did in N’gbala & Branscombe’s 1997 experiment), 
so that comparisons between characters are not possible, 
the ratings of regret for each character are likely to be 
driven by a comparison within the model set for that char-
acter (see Byrne & McEleney, 2000). This comparison 
is between the factual and counterfactual models for the 
character’s decision. In the case of each of the characters 
described in Table 1, there is a gap between what hap-
pened and what might have happened. Mr. George regrets 
the loss that arose from trading his stock, and Mr. Paul 
regrets the loss that occurred due to his failure to move his 
investment. Dave regrets his decision not to move because 
he might have been happy at College B. Finally, regret is 
attributed to Jim because his decision to move, which 
resulted in a negative outcome, is compared either to a 
counterfactual in which he did not move and was happy 
or to a counterfactual state of affairs in which he did not 
move and continued to be unhappy. Although the unhappy 
outcome was equally bad for Jim and Dave, Jim’s situa-
tion was made even worse by the fact that he was just as 
unhappy following the upheaval involved in moving from 
College A to College B. Because there are grounds for 
the attribution of significant amounts of regret to each of 
these four characters, when information about them was 
presented in a between-participants design, no action ef-
fect occurred for the investment scenario (see N’gbala & 
Branscombe, 1997), and we expected no action effect to 
occur for the university scenario.
We argue that, in a within-participants design, an action 
effect occurs for the investment scenario because people 
ascribe regret to the characters in the scenario on the 
basis of a comparison between model sets (see N’gbala 
Table 1 
Suggested Initial Model Sets for the Actor and Nonactor  
in the Investment and University Scenarios
Investment Scenario
Mr. George (Actor)
Factual possibility Moves from Company B to Company A Worse off by $1,200
Counterfactual possibility Stays with Company B Better off by $1,200
Mr. Paul (Nonactor)
Factual possibility Stays with Company A Worse off by $1,200
Counterfactual possibility Moves from Company A to Company B Better off by $1,200
University Scenario
Jim (Actor)
Factual possibility Moves from College A to College B Unhappy
Counterfactual possibilities Stays at College A Happy
Stays at College A Unhappy
Dave (Nonactor)
Factual possibility Stays at College A Unhappy
Counterfactual possibility  Moves from College A to College B  Happy
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& Branscombe, 1997). Each of these model sets contains 
a factual model with a negative outcome and a counter-
factual model with a positive outcome. Comparison be-
tween model sets is facilitated by their similarity, which 
makes them more alignable (see Gentner & A. B. Mark-
man, 1997) and hence easier to compare (for a discussion 
of automaticity, similarity processing, and comparison, 
see A. B. Markman & Gentner, 2005). The processing of 
similarities between the model sets for each character has 
the paradoxical effect of making the difference between 
the decisions they represent more salient (see Gentner & 
Gunn, 2001). There are several ideas in the literature about 
the differences between actions and inactions that result in 
the same negative outcome. Accordingly, more regret may 
be attributed to an unsuccessful actor because he might be 
regarded as less wise (N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997), or 
more responsible for the negative outcome (Zeelenberg, 
van der Pligt, & de Vries, 2000). Another possibility, 
which is consistent with previous work on the action effect 
(see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982), is that more regret may be attributed to the actor 
because the counterfactual for the actor can be generated 
more easily than can the counterfactual for the nonactor.
Although comparisons between the actor and the non-
actor may be relatively straightforward for the investment 
scenario, they are less likely to be so for the university 
scenario. This is because there is uncertainty about what 
would have befallen Dave, the nonactor, had he trans-
ferred. There are two possible counterfactuals for Dave: 
Had he transferred, Dave might have been happy or he 
might have been unhappy. We suggested above that people 
may initially represent the counterfactual state of affairs 
in which Dave transferred and was happy. However, in-
formation about Jim appears to suggest that this counter-
factual is unlikely to capture what would have happened 
had Dave transferred. After all, Jim also transferred, and 
he was still unhappy. Therefore, the factual outcome for 
Jim may suggest to people that their initial representation 
for Dave was incomplete. We suspect that this may cause 
participants to flesh out their model set for Dave so that 
it includes a model corresponding to a state of affairs in 
which Dave transferred and was unhappy.
After the fleshing-out process, the model set for each 
character specifies a negative factual state of affairs, as 
well as positive and negative counterfactual states of af-
fairs. Accordingly, with both of these characters there is 
considerable uncertainty about whether a different deci-
sion would have resulted in a positive outcome. In this 
sense, attributions of regret based on within-model set 
comparisons would not result in an action effect. How-
ever, just as was the case for the investment scenario, the 
similarities in the representations of decisions may facili-
tate a comparison between model sets and thus lead to the 
differences between sets becoming salient. As we have 
seen, once the difference between action and inaction be-
comes the focus of comparison, on any of several grounds, 
more regret may be attributed to the actor.
We saw several ways to test our proposals about how 
action and inaction are represented. For example, we knew 
that comparisons between the characters were necessary 
for an action effect to occur in the investment scenario 
(N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997). In Experiment 1, we 
verified that this was also true for the university scenario. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested for order effects in 
judgments of regret. Our central proposal about the ac-
tion effect in the university scenario was that it occurred 
because information about a decision to act with a nega-
tive outcome would cause participants to flesh out their 
representation of an inaction decision. On the other hand, 
information about a decision not to act with a bad outcome 
would not lead participants to flesh out their representation 
of an action decision. Thus, even in a within-participants 
design we did not expect to observe an action effect with 
the university scenario when people read about and rate 
Dave, the nonactor, before they read about and rate Jim, 
the actor. If information about Jim were unavailable to 
participants when they were thinking about Dave, they 
would not flesh out their representation of Dave’s deci-
sion. Accordingly, we expected there to be an asymmetry 
between people’s model sets for action and inaction, an 
asymmetry which, we suggested, would make people less 
likely to base their attributions on a comparison between 
model sets. However, if information about Jim’s decision 
outcome were available to participants when they made a 
regret judgment for Dave, they would base that judgment 
on a fleshed-out model set for Dave. This would then lead 
to the generation of highly similar model sets for action 
and inaction, to comparisons between model sets and, 
therefore, to the occurrence of an action effect.
EXPERIMENT 1 
Manipulating Order in the University Scenario
In Experiment 1, we employed a design that allowed us 
to control for the order in which participants read about 
the characters. In this design, participants first read a de-
scription of, and provided regret ratings for, one character 
and then the other. The participants in one experimental 
condition initially provided regret ratings for Jim, the 
actor, without any knowledge of Dave, the nonactor; the 
participants in the other experimental condition initially 
provided regret ratings for Dave without any knowledge 
of Jim. Only after they had provided these ratings were 
participants given a description of, and asked to make a 
regret rating for, the second character.
Because each set of participants initially read about, 
and rated, a different character, this design allowed us 
to see whether N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) find-
ing that the action effect does not occur in a between-
 participants design would generalize from the investment 
to the university scenario. This design also allowed us to 
test our predictions about fleshing out. We had suggested 
the following: (1) that the action effect may be due to a 
comparison between people’s mental representations for 
action and inaction; (2) that people may compare Dave 
and Jim because their mental representations for both may 
be similar—both may contain a negative factual model as 
well as a positive and a negative counterfactual model; 
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and (3) that people’s model set for Dave may contain a 
counterfactual with a negative outcome as well as a coun-
terfactual with a positive outcome only because informa-
tion about Jim may contradict the model in people’s ini-
tial representation in which Dave moved and was happy. 
If these claims were correct, then we speculated that an 
action effect would only be observed when information 
about Jim was available to participants as they read about 
and rated Dave. Thus, we predicted that an action effect 
would occur when people received information about Jim 
before they received information about Dave, and that no 
effect would occur when the information was received in 
the opposite order.
Method
Participants and Procedure. A total of 150 students at the Uni-
versity of Plymouth participated in this experiment. The participants 
read and rated their scenarios individually.
Design. The experiment had a 3  2 mixed design. The within-
participants factor was the character rated and had two levels, since 
all participants provided a regret rating for both the actor and the 
nonactor. We will refer to the between-participants variable, which 
had three levels, as our experimental condition variable. One group 
of participants received information about the characters together 
(the control condition), and the other two groups received this infor-
mation sequentially. One of the latter two groups received informa-
tion about the actor prior to receiving information about the nonactor 
(the actor–nonactor condition), and the final group received infor-
mation about the nonactor first (the nonactor–actor condition).
Materials. We used three sets of materials. The first set contained 
the university scenario used by Gilovich and Medvec (1994). After 
reading the scenario, the participants were asked to estimate on a 
pair of lines—each line 100 mm long—the degree of regret felt by 
the actor and the nonactor upon learning of the outcome of their re-
spective decisions. One end of each scale was labeled low regret and 
the other was labeled high regret. The order in which these scales 
appeared on the page was counterbalanced.
The other two sets of materials were constructed by separating the 
information concerning the actor and the nonactor. Thus, the partici-
pants in the actor–nonactor condition initially read about Jim, a col-
lege student who was unhappy at his current university and decided to 
go elsewhere. This description was followed with a rating scale iden-
tical to those used in the control condition, in which the participants 
made regret ratings for Jim. Next, this group of participants read about 
Dave, a college student who, although he was unhappy at his current 
university, decided not to transfer to another institution. This second 
description was also followed by a rating scale. The participants in the 
nonactor–actor condition received the same descriptions and rating 
scales, but in the opposite order. The descriptions were presented on 
separate pages, and the participants were required to make their judg-
ment about the first character before reading about the second. All 
three groups of participants were told that the characters did not know 
one another. This information appeared at the start of the control ma-
terials and at the start of the second description for the actor–nonactor 
and the nonactor–actor materials.
Results
Our participants’ estimates on the 100-mm lines were 
converted to ratings on a 100-point scale in which higher 
ratings indicated greater estimated regret. To examine 
whether N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) finding of a 
null effect in a between-participants design would gen-
eralize from the investment to the university scenario, 
we compared the mean regret rating for the actor when 
information about him was presented first (M  75.54; 
SD  20.76) with the mean regret rating for the nonactor 
when he was presented first (M  76.08; SD  19.98). 
The difference between these means was nonsignificant 
[t(1,98)  0.13].
Of most interest in the results of the 3  2 mixed de-
sign ANOVA, which we carried out to test our predictions 
about the effect of information order on the action effect, 
was the interaction between character and experimental 
condition, which fell just short of statistical significance 
[F(2,147)  2.62, MSe  381.09, p  .08]. The means 
involved in this interaction are presented in Figure 1. Be-
cause we had made strong predictions for this interaction, 
we used planned comparisons to test for significant dif-
ferences between the means involved. These tests revealed 
that a significant action effect occurred in the control con-
dition [F(1,147)  10.22, MSe  381.10, p  .002] and 
in the condition in which the nonactor was rated second 
Figure 1. Mean regret ratings from Experiment 1 (on the left) and Experiment 2 (on the 
right).
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[F(1,147)  9.92, MSe  381.10, p  .002]. However, in 
the condition in which the participants received and rated 
a description of the nonactor first, no action effect was ob-
served [F(1,147)  0.2]. Before we discuss these results, 
we will describe the results of Experiment 2, in which we 
used the same procedure to investigate order effects in the 
investment scenario.
EXPERIMENT 2 
Manipulating Order in the Investment Scenario
We predicted that character order would determine 
whether an action effect would occur for the university 
scenario in Experiment 1 because information about an 
unsuccessful actor may contradict people’s initial model 
of the counterfactual for Dave in which he moved and was 
happy. This contradiction may cause people to flesh out 
their representation of Dave so that it contains counterfac-
tual models corresponding to the state of affairs in which 
he moved and was unhappy as well as the state of affairs 
in which he moved and was happy. As a result of the 
 fleshing-out process, people’s representations of action 
and inaction are likely to be similar and regret is likely to 
be attributed on the basis of a comparison between model 
sets. However, in the investment scenario, we suggested 
that people’s initial model sets for action and inaction are 
similar without the need for fleshing out. Had Mr. Paul 
moved his stock he would have been better off, and had 
Mr. George not moved his stock he would have been bet-
ter off. For each decision, the factual outcomes are nega-
tive, and the only counterfactual possibility has a posi-
tive outcome. Thus, information about the actor is likely 
to convey nothing beyond what is contained in people’s 
initial representation of inaction. Just as we predicted for 
the university scenario, we hypothesized that more regret 
would be attributed to the nonactor in the investment sce-
nario on the basis of a comparison between the highly 
similar model sets. Crucially, since we proposed that a 
fleshing-out process does not underlie the action effect in 
this scenario, we should have observed the effect regard-
less of the order in which participants read about and rated 
the characters.
Method
Participants and Procedure. A total of 153 visitors to Durham 
University participated in this experiment. The participants indi-
vidually read and rated the characters in their scenarios in group 
sessions that had no time limits.
Design. The experiment had a 3 (experimental condition)  2 
(character) mixed design.
Materials. We used three sets of materials. The first set contained 
a version of the investment scenario (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
The companies in the scenario were called Omex and Revon. After 
reading the scenario, the participants were asked to estimate on a 
10-point scale the degree of regret felt by the actor and the nonactor 
upon learning of the outcome of their respective decisions. One end 
of each scale was labeled no regret and the other was labeled very 
high regret. The order in which these scales appeared on the page 
was counterbalanced.
The other two sets of materials were constructed by separating 
the information concerning the actor and the nonactor. Thus, the 
participants in the actor–nonactor condition initially read about 
Mr. George, who decided to trade his stock. After the participants 
completed a scale identical to those used in the control condition, 
this group read about Mr. Paul. A rating scale followed this sec-
ond description. The participants in the nonactor–actor condition 
received the same descriptions and rating scales, but in the opposite 
order. The descriptions were presented on separate pages, and the 
participants were required to make their judgment about the first 
character before reading about the second.
Results
For consistency with Experiment 1, the participants’ 
estimates on the 10-point scale used in this experiment 
were converted to ratings on a 100-point scale in which 
higher ratings indicated greater attributed regret. Mean 
ratings, broken down by experimental condition and 
character, are shown in Figure 1. To test whether we had 
replicated N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) finding of 
a null effect when information about each character is 
presented separately to different groups of participants, 
we compared the mean regret rating for the actor when 
he was presented first (M  71.4; SD  21.76) with the 
mean for the nonactor when he was presented first (M  
65.19; SD  23.47). The difference was nonsignificant 
[t(100)  1.38, p  .15]. 
A 3  2 mixed design ANOVA yielded a nonsignificant 
interaction between character and experimental condition 
[F(2,150)  1.98, MSe  217.41, p  .14]. Planned com-
parisons revealed that, as was the case for the university 
scenario, a significant action effect occurred with the in-
tegrated version of the investment scenario [F(1,150)  
22.73, MSe  217.41, p  .001] as well as with the 
condition in which the participants rated the actor first 
[F(1,150)  4.14, MSe  217.41, p  .05]. Contrary to 
the results obtained in Experiment 1, planned compari-
sons also revealed that a significant action effect occurred 
when the participants rated the nonactor first [F(1,150)  
7.80, MSe  217.41, p  .01].
Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2
We replicated N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) find-
ing that no action effect occurs for the investment scenario 
when different groups of participants read about each 
character separately. We also have shown that this finding 
generalized to the university scenario. Thus, the results 
of Experiments 1 and 2 support the claim that the action 
effect, which occurs when participants are presented with 
the university and investment scenarios, is caused by the 
participants’ comparisons between the actor and nonac-
tor. In addition, we only observed an action effect in the 
university scenario, when information about the actor 
was available to participants while they were judging the 
nonactor, whereas the action effect was observed in the 
investment scenario regardless of the order in which the 
characters were presented. These findings support our 
speculation that in the university scenario, in which coun-
terfactual outcomes are uncertain, when information is 
given to people about an unsuccessful action, this may 
cause them to flesh out their representation of inaction. As 
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a result of this fleshing-out process, people’s representa-
tions of both factual and counterfactual outcomes for each 
decision are negative. In the investment scenario, in which 
no fleshing out takes place, the actual outcomes for both 
decisions are negative, whereas the counterfactual out-
comes are positive. In both the investment and university 
scenarios, therefore, there was likely to be parity between 
the actual and counterfactual outcomes that were repre-
sented for each character. In each case, it was only the de-
cision that led to the actual outcome that differed between 
characters, and less regret was attributed to the nonactor 
because his decision was judged more wise (N’gbala & 
Branscombe, 1997), less responsible for the outcome (see 
Zeelenberg et al., 2000), or less mutable (see Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1982) than the alternative decision to act.
EXPERIMENT 3
We claimed that the initial model set for Dave, the non-
actor in the university scenario, contained a model cor-
responding to the counterfactual state of affairs in which 
Dave moved and was happy. However, information about 
the factual state of affairs for the actor suggested that this 
representation was incomplete. Accordingly, people may 
flesh out their representation of the nonactor so that it 
includes a model of the counterfactual state of affairs in 
which Dave moved and was unhappy. It is important to 
note that people’s initial representation of Dave is insuffi-
cient only if they assume that what has befallen Jim would 
also befall Dave. If there is reason to suspect that what 
happened to Jim is not a good guide for making predic-
tions about Dave, then the initial representation for Dave 
may well be sufficient, the process of fleshing out unnec-
essary, the similarity between model sets for each charac-
ter decreased and, hence, the action effect nonexistent.
In Experiment 3 we tested our suggestion about flesh-
ing out by manipulating the similarity that was said to hold 
between the characters in the university scenario. The ra-
tionale for our manipulation was the following: The more 
similar the two characters are, the more likely it is that the 
nonactor—had he moved—would have been just as un-
happy as the actor. Conversely, the less similar characters 
are said to be, the less likely it is that the nonactor—had 
he acted—would have ended up with the same outcome 
as the actor. We expected the outcome for the actor to be 
informative in the former case but not in the latter. There-
fore, fleshing out was likely to take place in the former 
case, leading to the occurrence of an action effect. On the 
other hand, fleshing out was less likely to occur in the lat-
ter case, and no action effect should have been observed.
Method
Participants and Procedure. Fifty-four undergraduate students 
from a variety of departments at Durham University participated in 
this experiment. The participants completed their ratings individu-
ally in several group sessions that had no time limits.
Materials and Design. This experiment had a 2  2  2 mixed 
design. All the participants received a variant of the integrated uni-
versity scenario used in Experiment 1. The between-participants 
variable was the similarity said to hold between the actor’s and the 
nonactor’s situations. This variable was achieved by adding a sen-
tence after the first sentence of the standard university scenario (the 
exact text of this scenario is presented in the introduction). For the 
participants in the group that received the similar condition, this 
sentence read “Psychological testing, administered to all new stu-
dents of the university, has shown them to be highly similar in all 
respects.” For the participants in the dissimilar condition, the word 
similar in this statement was changed to dissimilar.
All the participants provided regret ratings on separate scales for 
both the actor and the nonactor. The order in which these scales ap-
peared was counterbalanced. In this experiment, we used an 11-point 
scale labeled no regret at one end and high regret at the other. All the 
participants were asked to provide regret ratings for both characters 
in the short and in the long term (see Byrne & McEleney, 2000; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). However, for ease of exposition, here 
we will report only the results for participants’ short-term ratings 
of regret.
Results and Discussion
Prior to analyzing the results of the experiment, we con-
verted participants’ regret ratings on the 11-point scale to 
scores on a 100-point scale. This was done for consistency 
between this experiment and Experiments 1 and 2. The 
rescaled means and standard errors for the regret ratings 
from this experiment can be seen in Figure 2. A 2  2 
mixed design ANOVA revealed a marginally significant 
interaction between character and similarity [F(1,52)  
3.10, MSe  521.53, p  .09]. With regard to the condi-
tion in which the characters were said to be highly similar, 
planned comparisons revealed a significant action effect 
[F(1,52)  11.65, MSe  521.53, p  .002]. However, in 
the dissimilar condition, there was no evidence for such 
an effect [F(1,52)  0.9].
The results of this experiment show that it is possible to 
block the action effect by informing the participants that 
the characters described in the university scenario are dis-
similar. This finding further supports our claims about the 
representations of action and inaction that underlie the ac-
tion effect. When the characters are dissimilar, the informa-
tion people receive about the factual state of affairs for Jim 
does not suggest to them that their initial representation for 
Figure 2. Mean regret ratings from Experiment 3.
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Dave is incomplete. Because their characters are dissimilar, 
Dave could very well have been happy had he moved, even 
though Jim has moved and is unhappy. There is no need 
for fleshing out, and without fleshing out, the model sets 
for the characters are different, Dave and Jim have separate 
grounds for regret, and an action effect does not occur.
When the characters are similar, on the other hand, 
information about what has befallen Jim may suggest to 
people that their initial representation for Dave is unsat-
isfactory. We suggest that this necessitates a fleshing-out 
process, leading to a model set for each character that 
contains a negative factual outcome and several uncertain 
counterfactual outcomes. These model sets differ only in 
the decisions that led to the factual outcomes. Since Dave 
has not acted to bring about the negative outcome, his de-
cision is judged wiser, less responsible, or less mutable 
than Jim’s; thus, less regret is attributed to him.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have outlined a revised mental models account of 
the action effect in judgments of regret and reported the 
results of three experiments in support of our account. 
Under this account, people construct mental models of the 
actual and counterfactual states of affairs for the decisions 
made by each of the characters described in the scenarios 
that are most commonly used to demonstrate the action 
effect. The action effect occurs because the model sets for 
each decision are highly alignable (see Gentner & A. B. 
Markman, 1997). That is, both contain one factual, one 
upward counterfactual, and for some decisions, one down-
ward counterfactual model. All that differs between the 
model sets is the decision made by each character leading 
up to a negative outcome, and less regret is attributed to 
the nonactor because he has not acted to bring about the 
negative outcome. It is important to note that in cases with 
uncertain counterfactual outcomes this comparison be-
tween the characters is preceded by a fleshing-out process 
in which information about the unsuccessful actor leads to 
a modulation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) of the initial 
model set for the nonactor.
For a scenario with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, 
we have shown that an action effect occurs only when in-
formation about the actor is available to participants while 
they are judging the nonactor. This finding does not gen-
eralize to scenarios with certain counterfactual outcomes. 
When the scenario with uncertain counterfactual outcomes 
was manipulated so that the factual outcome for the actor 
was unlikely to tell us what would have happened to the 
nonactor had he acted, no action effect was observed. That 
is, fleshing out occurred only when information about the 
actor suggested that the initial representation for the non-
actor was insufficient. In the absence of a fleshing-out 
process, each character had separate grounds for feeling 
bad, and regret was attributed on the basis of a compari-
son within the model set for each decision—between what 
happened and what might have happened.
Unsurprisingly, our modified account of the action ef-
fect contains several similarities to the account sketched 
by Byrne and McEleney (2000). In their account, just 
as in ours, the participants construct mental models that 
correspond to factual and counterfactual states of affairs. 
Their account also stresses the difference between deci-
sions whose counterfactual outcomes are certain and 
those whose counterfactual outcomes are uncertain. Both 
accounts appeal to fleshing-out processes in order to ex-
plain the effects of experimental manipulations and both 
suggest the existence of asymmetries in people’s initial 
representations for action and inaction.
However, there are also some differences between Byrne 
and McEleney’s (2000) account and ours. For example, we 
suggest that the asymmetry between action and inaction 
with respect to the number of models in the initial model 
set occurs only for decisions with uncertain outcomes. For 
decisions with certain outcomes, we assume that people 
construct fully fleshed-out representations for action and 
inaction. For decisions with uncertain counterfactual out-
comes, we assume that people construct a fully fleshed-out 
set of models to represent an unsuccessful action, whereas 
to represent a decision not to act people construct a par-
tially fleshed-out representation, containing models for 
factual and upward counterfactual states of affairs. Byrne 
and McEleney, on the other hand, claim that people ini-
tially construct a partially fleshed-out representation con-
taining a factual and a counterfactual model for action, but 
they initially only explicitly represent the factual state of 
affairs for inaction. Under Byrne and McEleney’s account, 
the counterfactual outcomes for inaction are fleshed out 
only when people are asked to make a judgment about 
regret in the long term. Fleshing out is also important in 
our account. However, in situations with more than one 
possible counterfactual outcome, we suggest that fleshing 
out occurs when information about an unsuccessful action 
leads people to believe that their initial representation of 
inaction is unsatisfactory or incomplete.
Byrne and McEleney (2000) sketched their account 
of the action effect was sketched in order to account for 
the effect of temporal perspective on attributions of re-
gret. According to Gilovich and Medvec (1994), although 
action is regretted in the short term, a variety of cogni-
tive and motivational factors combine to make inaction 
more regrettable than action in the long term. Byrne and 
 McEleney showed that a long-term inaction effect only 
occurs with the university scenario and that regret is at-
tributed to action in the investment scenario in the short 
and the long term. Byrne and McEleney attributed this 
finding to the uncertainty about the counterfactual out-
come for Dave, the character who did not move, in the 
university scenario. According to Byrne and McEleney, 
people only represent the factual state of affairs for Dave 
in the short term, but they flesh out their representation to 
include the upward and downward counterfactuals when 
asked about long-term regret. According to our account, 
people’s representation for Dave’s decision not to act in-
cludes a factual and an upward counterfactual model from 
the start. The fleshing-out process, which is prompted 
by information about Jim’s action with negative conse-
quences, causes people to change their representation of 
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the counterfactual for Dave. However, information about 
Jim does not suggest that it is impossible that Dave would 
have been happy had he moved. Although it is likely that 
Dave would have been unhappy, it may be the participants’ 
intuition that Dave would come to rue the possibility of 
happiness that he has missed by not moving, and thus par-
ticipants expect him to experience regret with the passing 
of time. Accordingly, they attribute greater regret to Dave 
in the long term.
Although many of the elements in our account are con-
sistent with existing claims about how people think with 
mental models, we are making at least one novel distinc-
tion. Like Byrne and McEleney (2000), we suggest that 
people may construct a model set for each of the characters 
described in the scenario and that regret is often attributed 
on the basis of a comparison between the models within 
this model set. However, unlike Byrne and McEleney, we 
claim that people may sometimes make a judgment on 
the basis of a comparison between model sets. We make 
this suggestion because, without it, we see no means of 
accounting for N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) and 
our own failure to find an action effect in a between- 
participants design. To the best of our knowledge, no such 
claim has previously been made in the literature on mental 
models. However, comparisons between model sets are 
likely to occur in cases involving social comparison (for a 
review, see Wood, 1996), either when a comparison is ex-
plicitly called for or when some similarity in the contents 
of model sets that represent different individuals facili-
tates a comparison between them.
In conclusion, we have outlined how the mental model 
theory might be applied to the action effect in counterfac-
tual thinking so that it can account for N’gbala and Brans-
combe’s (1997) and our own results. The application of the 
theory suggested here led to several novel predictions that 
have been confirmed by our experiments. By applying the 
model theory to a phenomenon that appears to result from 
simple social comparison processes, we hope that our work 
adds weight to the argument recently made by Byrne and 
her colleagues (Byrne, 1997; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; 
McCloy & Byrne, 2000; Walsh & Byrne, 2004) that the 
theory may be applied to social cognitive phenomena as 
well as to the key phenomena of deductive reasoning.
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